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 American Jurisprudence between the VWars:
 Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory
 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.
 DURING the I930's the American legal profession became the forum for one of
 the most bitter and sustained intellectual debates in the nation's history. A new
 generation of legal scholars, inspired by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
 attempting a scientific study of law, was developing a sweeping critique of Amer-
 ican jurisprudence that went far beyond the criticisms of such sociological jurists
 as Roscoe Pound and Benjamin N. Cardozo. By I930 their stinging attacks on
 established legal conceptions had alarmed traditional-minded jurists and within
 a few years had raised distressing questions from the standpoint of democratic
 theory about the nature and basis of law. The frightening challenge of totalitar-
 ianism in the late thirties moved the debate out of the realm of mere juristic
 speculation and gave it a tone of urgency and crisis.
 The new legal criticism developed out of the same intellectual environment
 that generated new attitudes throughout American intellectual life. The increasing
 prominence of the physical sciences, at least since the time of Charles Darwin, had
 been convincing more and more individuals that knowledge of the physical world
 and of human beings themselves could only be attained through the use of the
 scientific method. By the beginning of the twentieth century the pragmatism of
 William James and especially of John Dewey had provided a broad philosophy
 that attempted to explain the human and social meaning of science and that
 suggested how the scientific method could be employed to understand and resolve
 human problems on all levels. Large numbers of American thinkers in many
 diverse fields began to adopt a more empirical, experimental, and relativistic atti-
 tude toward the problems and guiding assumptions of their disciplines. The im-
 pact of science and pragmatism, together with the desire for the improvement of
 man's social and political life that many intellectuals shared, brought new vitality,
 ideas, and methods to the expanding social sciences.
 Through such approaches as functionalism and behaviorism, American psy-
 chologists were striving to make their discipline experimental; the new science
 began to play an increasingly prominent role in the social thought of the twentieth
 -After receiving his doctorate in 1968 from the University of Wisconsin, where he worked under
 Irvin G. Wyllie, Mr. Purcell taught for two years in an experimental interdisciplinary program at the
 University of California, Berkeley. He is now a visiting assistant professor at the University of
 Missouri. His essay, "Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act," Journal of
 American History, LIV (Dec. 1967), won the Organization of American Historians' Pelzer Award for
 1967.
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 century. By offering to explain the sources and nature of human behavior, psy-
 chology promised to bring the elusive human factor under control and to enable
 social scientists to make their work wholly empirical. "The importance of the
 rapid rise of psychology in recent years," explained Edward S. Robinson, a
 psychologist working with the Yale University Law School, "is that it supplies
 a background for a natural science of society which has hitherto been lacking."'
 Because psychology seemed to answer an intellectual need that had grown acute
 by the twenties, many social scientists turned toward its discoveries and theories
 with renewed hope and enthusiasm.
 Rejecting the prescriptive theories of classical economics, such scholars as
 Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Mitchell studied production and distribution as
 problems in the institutional behavior of individuals and groups. "Economics,"
 Mitchell declared, "is a science of human behavior."2 Charles Merriam urged his
 fellow political scientists to apply the discoveries of psychology and the other
 social sciences to the study of politics, and along with many of his colleagues
 produced closely detailed studies of the actual operations of governments, politi-
 cians, and pressure groups. Bronislaw Malinowski refined techniques of careful
 observation and description in anthropological field work and developed a theory
 of society based on the functional interrelationships of all parts of a culture.3
 Throughout those disciplines the new empirical, experimental approach empha-
 sized the importance of analyzing social phenomena in terms of functions and
 behavior.
 Along with the primary reliance upon scientific methods came a pervasive
 epistemological and ethical relativism. Because valid knowledge had to be based
 on empirical evidence, all a priori absolutes were unproven and unprovable. All
 knowledge was necessarily tentative and subject to change. Since science sup-
 posedly dealt only with objective facts and was morally neutral, the one practically
 reliable method of reaching truths was inoperative where questions of an ethical
 nature were concerned. Although a few men such as Dewey maintained that the
 scientific method could develop and substantiate moral values, most scholars in
 the interwar decades were not convinced. The empirical documentation of wide-
 spread cultural relativism by anthropologists like Ruth Benedict confirmed the
 relativistic trend, as did the analyses of the nature of historical knowledge by such
 scholars as Carl Becker and Charles Beard. By the early thirties both Beard and
 Becker were arguing that historical judgments could never be truly objective
 because they were based on partial evidence, were not subject to experimental
 testing, and were warped by the desires and beliefs of the historian. Value judg-
 1 Edward S. Robinson, Law and the Lawyers (New York, I935), 49.
 2 Wesley Clair Mitchell, "The Prospects of Economics," in The Trend of Economics, ed. Rexford
 G. Tugwell (New York, 1935), 22.
 3 For examples, see Charles Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago, I925); Bronislaw Malinow-
 ski, "Introduction," in Robert I. Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia-A Study of Primitive Legal
 Institutions (2d ed., Hamden, Conn., I96I).
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 ments, Beard concluded along with most of his contemporaries, "cannot be
 'proved' by reference to historical occurrences or anything else."4
 While the basic attitudes of an empirical and relativistic social science spread
 throughout most of American intellectual life, they penetrated legal thinking
 slowly and haltingly. As late as the 1920'S the predominant legal theory still
 claimed that judicial decisions were made on the basis of rules and precedents
 defined historically and applied mechanically. The eighteenth-century concept of
 natural law served vaguely as the moral foundation for legislative and judicial
 actions, while Sir William Blackstone's statement of the common law provided
 many of the supposed first principles on which judicial decisions were based. The
 old legal theory claimed that reasoning proceeded syllogistically from those rules
 and precedents through the particular facts of a case to a clear decision. The sole
 function of the judge was to discover the proper rules and precedents involved
 and to apply them to the case as first premises. Once he had done that, the judge
 could decide the case logically with certainty and uniformity.5
 In spite of its established predominance, however, the old legal theory had
 already come under forceful attack by the beginning of the twenties. As early
 as i88i Justice Holmes, then a young lawyer in Boston, had published his famous
 study of the common law, which he placed in an evolutionary Darwinistic frame-
 work. Holmes argued that practical expedients, necessitated by the needs and
 conflicts of human society, were much more central to the development of law
 than were any logical propositions. The Common Law was, to use a congenial
 Holmesian metaphor, the first cannon shot in his fifty-year battle against the
 armies of legalistic formalism.
 By I897 the basic outline of his scientific, relativist attack was clear. Law was
 not an abstract problem of logic, but a practical question of social management.
 Judges did not in fact settle cases by deductive reasoning; rather they necessarily
 decided what was socially desirable according to their personal and class beliefs.
 Those beliefs, like all moral values, were wholly relative and determined by one's
 particular environment. The power of deductive logic and the ethical and social
 absolutes that the method claimed to establish were simply illusions that masked
 the actual working of the legal process. By the law, Holmes declared, he meant
 no metaphysical truths or grand moral principles such as a rationally knowable
 "natural law," but only "the incidence of the public force through the instrumen-
 tality of the courts." The lawyer's sole duty was to predict how the courts would
 use that force, and hence to advise his clients most effectively. Thus defining the
 4 Charles A. Beard, The Discussion of Human Affairs (New York, I936), II9-20; see also id.,
 "Written History as an Act of Faith," American Historical Review, XXXIX (Jan. I934), 2I9-29; Carl
 L. Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian," ibid., XXXVII (Jan. 1932), 221-36; Ruth Benedict,
 Patterns of Culture (New York, 1934).
 5 See Roscoe Pound's original attack, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," Columbia Lat Review, VIII
 (Dec. I908), 605-23; Edwin W. Patterson, jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law (Brooklyn,
 N. Y., I953), 465-66; and Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform,
 and the judicial Process (Ithaca, N. Y., 1968), 49-51.
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 law in empirical, behavioral terms, Holmes urged his colleagues to study "the
 operations of the law" rather than its phraseology or moral connotations.6
 By the first decade of the twentieth century other scholars were beginning to
 follow Holmes's lead and to apply the insights of the new scientific, pragmatic
 outlook. John Chipman Gray, a professor of law at Harvard University, stressed
 the pre-eminent role of the individual judge as opposed to the logic of the law
 itself in deciding particular cases. Louis D. Brandeis, and later Felix Frankfurter,
 argued that judges must consciously consider the probable social results of their
 decisions. Scientific studies of social needs and problems, rather than syllogistic
 reasoning, should be the determining factor. To guide the judges in their assess-
 ment of those social results, both men employed briefs loaded with a maximum
 of sociological evidence and a minimum of logical argumentation.7
 Much of the theoretical justification for the "Brandeis brief" came from the
 work of a young law professor at the University of Nebraska, Roscoe Pound, who
 wrote a series of articles showing the need for and relevance of a new sociological
 jurisprudence. "The sociological movement in jurisprudence," he explained in I908,
 "is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law."8 Agreeing with Holmes
 that legal scholars must study the way laws operate in practice, Pound insisted that
 the overemphasis on logical uniformity and theoretical certainty that characterized
 much of the older approach often frustrated the just practical settlement of partic-
 ular cases. Only by studying the social impact of legal principles and rules could
 men know whether the law in fact brought about the administration of real jus-
 tice. While Pound and Holmes agreed on many points, especially on the mechan-
 ical and abstract nature of the older legal theory, Pound's greater emphasis on
 the ideal of justice conflicted with Holmes's more cynical view of moral values in
 the law. Ultimately that difference would be one of the central reasons for Pound's
 rejection of Holmes's disciples, who were to some extent also his own, in the i93o's.
 It was thus in a rigid and formalistic profession that nevertheless had produced
 a Holmes and a Pound, and in a broader intellectual environment that recognized
 science as the method of reaching truth, that the so-called legal realists came of
 age. Of a sample of twenty-two of the most important new critics only five had
 been born before i88o, while eight were born during the i88o's, and nine after
 i890. By I930 when their collective efforts were first termed "legal realism" their
 average age was still only forty-two.9 Thus the realists formed a younger genera-
 6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," in The Mind and Faith of justice Holmes:
 His Speeches, Essays, Letters and judicial Opinions, ed. Max Lerner (New York, I943), 72, 76.
 7 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law (2d ed., Boston, I963), 99-IOI, I68-73.
 For the "Brandeis brief," see the account in Robert E. Cushman and Robert F. Cushman, Cases in
 Constitutional Law (New York, I958), 58o.
 8 Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 609.
 9 Eighteen of the twenty-two were taken from Karl Llewellyn's initial identification of those whom
 he considered leading realists. (Karl N. Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism-Responding to
 Dean Pound," Harvard Law Review, XLIV [June I93I], 1222-64.) The eighteen are Underhill Moore,
 Herman Oliphant, Charles E. Clark, Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Walter Wheeler Cook, Thomas Reed
 Powell, Leon Green, Max Radin, William 0. Douglas, Hessel E. Yntema, Edwin W. Patterson, Arthur
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 tion of scholars, less committed to what they regarded as the rigid ways of the
 past and more willing to follow new methods and ideas. Having grown up with
 the spread of the scientific outlook and the successful growth of the social sciences,
 they readily accepted a critical, empirical attitude and hoped to apply it to the
 study of the legal process. Facing the need to discuss the observed facts of judicial
 behavior, many of the realists turned toward psychological theory for a scientific
 framework within which to work.
 While their pragmatic attitude made them hostile toward the older legal theory
 and their age put them in the position of a new generation ready to criticize
 established methods, the state of American law invited and even necessitated their
 devastating attacks. The inconsistencies between the practices of a rapidly chang-
 ing industrial nation and the claims of a mechanical juristic system had grown so
 acute by the I920'S that in the minds of an increasing number of individuals the
 old jurisprudence could no longer justify and explain contemporary practice. It
 had become clear, Judge Cardozo declared in 1932, that "the agitations and the
 promptings of a changing civilization" demanded more flexible legal forms and
 demanded equally "a jurisprudence and philosophy adequate to justify the
 change."'0
 At the same time even many of the strict proponents of the old jurisprudence
 had to admit that widespread confusion and uncertainty threatened the American
 legal system. Such a stalwart of orthodoxy as Elihu Root acknowledged that "the
 confusion, the uncertainty, was growing worse from year to year" and that as a
 result "the law was becoming guesswork."" Root, like many other lawyers, found
 the cause of confusion primarily in the massive growth of case law during the
 previous decades. The whole case law system had, in fact, become unwieldy since
 the I870's when the National Reporter system was inaugurated. At that time the
 West Publishing Company had begun printing all federal court opinions through-
 out the United States, in addition to all higher and some lower state court de-
 cisions. By the beginning of the twentieth century the National Reporter system
 had turned the inevitably increasing number of cases into an avalanche of reported
 precedents that made it impossible for judges to stay properly informed.'2 To their
 L. Corbin, Wesley A. Sturges, Leon Tulin, Joseph F. Francis, Joseph W. Bingham, and E. G. Loren-
 zen. Biographical material was unavailable for two of Llewellyn's original twenty (Joseph C. Hutche-
 son and Samuel Klaus). Four other scholars (Walter Nelles, Thurman Arnold, Robinson, and Felix S.
 Cohen) have impressed me as significant contributors to realism and have been added for that reason.
 The list does not include such younger realists as Myres McDougal or Fred Rodell. Brief biographical
 material on most of the realists is available in Association of American Law Schools, Directory of
 Teachers in Member Schools (St. Paul, Minn., I922-4I).
 10 Benjamin N. Cardozo, "Jurisprudence," in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, ed.
 Margaret E. Hall (New York, 1947), 8.
 11 "Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee," American Law Institute,
 Proceedings, I (Pt. 2, 1923), 48, cited in Rumble, American Legal Realism, 156. On the growth of
 case law, see also Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (New Haven, Conn., I924), I, 3-5,
 I6.
 12 Grant Gilinore, "Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure," Yalc Lawv fournal, LXX (June i961),
 I040-41.
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 great chagrin and bewilderment, members of the legal profession began uncover-
 ing contradictory and conflicting decisions with ever-increasing frequency.
 That plight was so widely recognized that in I923 Root and a number of his
 orthodox colleagues helped establish the American Law Institute to abolish con-
 fusion by a clear and updated "restatement" of the law. The organization's first
 report emphasized, in addition to the flood of precedents, a number of other
 contributing causes of legal uncertainty, including a lack of precision in the use
 of legal terms and a lack of agreement on basic common-law principles.13 For
 many of the young critics the widely acknowledged confusion was clear evidence
 that the syllogistic certainty of the law was a hollow claim and that the actual
 role of the individual judge was much wider and more crucial than the older
 jurisprudence allowed.
 The very fact that the new American Law Institute was attempting a "restate-
 ment" of the law was an additional factor provoking the new critique. Such a
 "restatement" assumed that law pre-existed in some whole form that could be
 discovered by logical analysis and that the job of the American Law Institute was
 merely to write it down. Most of the members of the institute still believed in the
 validity of the older juristic method and thought that a more rigorous application
 would resolve all difficulties. Convinced that law was a human product related to
 changing social and cultural conditions, the new critics rejected the idea of an
 official "restatement" as an impossible goal.'4
 The practical experience of many of the realists served to strengthen their
 awareness of the changing and subjective elements in the legal system. The great
 majority of them had practiced law for at least a year before starting to teach, and
 they were aware of the many individual, human factors that lay behind the actions
 of lawyers and judges. They knew firsthand the conflicting and confused nature
 of many precedents and rules. Such practical experience, as well as their pragmatic
 outlook, helped lead many of them to hostility toward the older jurisprudence.
 Recognizing the need both to understand the actual relationship between law and
 a changing society and to explain the reasons behind contemporary practice, they
 began their concerted though diverse probing for a new and scientific jurispru-
 dence.
 By the end of the twenties Yale, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities
 had become the centers of the new legal criticism. Charles E. Clark, who suc-
 ceeded Robert M. Hutchins as dean of the Yale University Law School in I929,
 brought such aggressive scholars as Jerome Frank, Walter Nelles, William 0.
 Douglas, Thurman Arnold, and Robinson to New Haven. In cooperation with
 Johns Hopkins University three of the most scientific-minded critics, Walter
 13 Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
 Law, "The Law's Uncertainty and Complexity," American Law Institute, Proceedings, I (Pt. I, I923),
 66-76.
 14For a brief bibliography of the realist critique of the program of the American Law Institute,
 see Rumble, American Legal Realism, 156, n. 40.
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 Wheeler Cook, Herman Oliphant, and Hessel E. Yntema, founded the research-
 oriented Institute of Law in I929. At Columbia University Karl N. Llewellyn,
 often regarded as the most important of the new critics, joined with Edwin W.
 Patterson, Underhill Moore, and others in publishing sharp essays probing the
 weaknesses of traditional jurisprudence. Dean Leon Green of Northwestern Uni-
 versity, Felix S. Cohen of the New School for Social Research, Max Radin of the
 University of California, Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard University, and Judge
 Joseph C. Hutcheson of the United States District Court in Texas were among
 those whose work placed them in the forefront of the new movement.
 The intense debate over legal realism as a collective movement began in ig3o
 when Llewellyn and Frank, then an attorney practicing in New York, published
 separate essays that struck the legal profession in rapid succession. Llewellyn used
 the phrase "Realistic Jurisprudence" to describe his suggested approach, and soon
 the term "legal realism" came to stand for the general attitude of all the new
 critics. While most of the so-called realists disliked the label, their enemies seized
 upon it as an epithet to brand what they considered an unsound and often
 dangerous attitude.
 Llewellyn's article on "Realistic Jurisprudence" centered on the distinction
 between abstract legal verbalisms and concrete empirical facts. "The traditional
 approach is in terms of words; it centers on words," he explained, adding point-
 edly, "it has the utmost difficulty in getting beyond words."l5 Legal phrases and
 concepts were simple devices to make the world more manageable, but the history
 of American law showed that those necessary abstractions "tend to take on an
 appearance of solidarity, reality and inherent value which has no foundation in
 experience."'6 Hence they led to a rigidity that forced new facts and situations
 to conform to outmoded concepts or else ignored the new altogether. Much of the
 law was an exercise in painful definition and strained syllogism that bore little
 resemblance to the real world it was supposed to govern.
 Such an important concept as that of the legal rule was a perfect example of
 the danger and ambiguity inherent in rigid abstractions, Llewellyn declared. While
 such authoritative rules were supposed to lead judges to proper decisions, they
 were in fact so vague and confused as often to be no help at all. When lawyers
 talked of legal rules, no one knew whether they were the lawyer's rule or the
 court's; whether they represented what the courts should do, or what they had
 done in fact; whether courts actually followed them, or merely used them to
 justify a decision reached on other grounds. Such fuzzy conceptions of legal rules
 led to large-scale uncertainty and contradiction in actual decisions and caused
 massive and often absurd twisting of terms in legal argumentation. Fundamental
 '5 Karl N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," Columbia Law Review, XXX
 (Apr. 1930), 443.
 16 lbid., 453.
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 conceptual imprecision, Llewellyn concluded, could only mean "confusion, profuse
 and inevitable."17
 He insisted that there was almost always a gap between the so-called rules of a
 case and its practical settlement. Admitting that legal rules had some uncertain
 influence on judges, he resolutely maintained that a realistic study of the law
 demanded an examination of the extent to which the rules actually controlled or
 influenced the case. "You cannot generalize on this, without investigation,"
 Llewellyn insisted. If men were ever to understand the legal system, they would
 have to study individual cases empirically. "The significance of the particular
 rule," he stressed, "will appear only after the investigation of the vital, focal
 phenomenon: the behavior."'8
 Llewellyn's empirical approach concentrated on behavior as the proper subject
 of study for the legal scholar. Behavior was real, whereas most legal argumenta-
 tion was simply verbal game playing. Following Holmes's lead, Llewellyn defined
 law in terms of the coercive actions taken by government officials. Regardless of
 syllogisms and definitions, the actual law was what the public force would sup-
 port. "What these officials do about disputes," Llewellyn wrote in a sentence that
 returned to haunt him, "is, to my mind, the law itself."'9 Using such a definition,
 the whole legal process was clearly susceptible to empirical study. Again following
 Holmes, Llewellyn declared that concepts of justice and ethical right had to be
 ignored when the actual operations of the law were analyzed. Such concepts
 merely confused the investigator by mixing considerations of "ought" where only
 the realities of "is" were relevant. "The most fruitful thinking about law," he
 remarked, "has run steadily toward regarding law as an engine (a heterogeneous
 multitude of engines) having purposes, not values in itself."20
 Accepting most of Llewellyn's ideas, Frank went far beyond them in earning
 his reputation as one of the most extreme realists. Whereas Llewellyn believed
 that rules and precedents were relevant and of some importance, Frank did not
 even consider them a meaningful part of the law. To him law meant a particular
 judicial determination upon a particular and singular set of facts. Reducing law
 to what he considered an unequivocal empirical minimum, Frank equated it
 solely with the specific individual judicial decisions. "Until a court has passed on
 these facts," he insisted, "no law on that subject is yet in existence. "21
 Rules and precedents were not part of the law because they had little if any
 effect on actual judicial decisions. No one could reason out a decision by syllogism,
 Frank declared. Instead judges had "hunches" about how cases should be decided
 and then looked up the proper rules that would support their "hunch." "Judicial
 judgments, like other judgments," Frank maintained, "doubtless in most cases,
 17 Ibid., 439.
 18 Ibid., 444.
 19 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York, 1930), 12.
 20 Id., "Realistic Jurisprudence," 464.
 21 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (2d ed., New York, I963), 50.
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 are worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formulated."22 A judicial
 opinion was actually only the judge's rationalization, not the real explanation for
 his decision. Judges manipulated precedents in the same way: after they made
 their decision, they sought favorable precedents or reinterpreted unfavorable ones
 to support it. "What the courts in fact do," Frank charged, "is to manipulate the
 language of former decisions."23
 As a result of realistic, empirical analysis of actual decisions, it became clear
 that the law was not a rational whole, nor even largely logical. In addition to
 personal prejudices, judicial objectivity was further deflected by the necessity
 of relying on secondhand evidence concerning the facts, relayed by lawyers,
 parties to the case, and witnesses who distorted the facts through prejudice, mis-
 understanding, ignorance, or simple falsification. The facts of any case were
 thus necessarily elusive and essentially subjective. The law was vague, uncertain,
 and necessarily partial and prejudiced. "To predict the decisions of the courts
 on many a point," Frank argued, "is impossible."24
 In spite of the practical uncertainty and subjectivity, Frank continued, most
 lawyers and judges still insisted that law was essentially rational and certain.
 The explanation for that contradiction, he suggested, lay in what he called the
 "legal absolutist" mind. The father-child pattern, bred deeply during every indi-
 vidual's childhood, drove most men continually to seek some powerful authority
 figure which would act as a substitute for the "Father-as-Infallible-Judge."25
 Because the law served as a natural authority figure, Frank concluded, it sub-
 consciously stimulated the latent childish emotions of those who studied it. "We
 would seem to be justified in surmising that the subject-matter of the law is one
 which evokes, almost irresistibly, regressive emotions."26 Most lawyers and judges,
 therefore, unconsciously developed an "absolutist" viewpoint that made them
 see the law as a father-like authority figure, necessarily certain and just in opera-
 tion. That subconscious drive prevented them from recognizing the true nature
 of the legal system.
 The manipulation of abstract concepts provided the method with which
 lawyers and judges could construct a facade of certainty and absolute rationality
 over the confused legal process. Referring to such manipulation as "Platonism"
 and "Scholasticism," he charged that the "absolutists" used "magical phrases"
 to convince themselves that all was well and to rationalize awkward facts. Frank
 considered concrete facts as the only important reality. Such abstract rationaliza-
 tions were merely escapes and delusions. "Virtually empty concepts," Frank
 remarked, "seem to give to the metaphysician the stable world he requires."27
 22 Ibid., io9; see also ibid., II4-2I.
 2 3 Ibid., I 5 9.
 24 Ibid., 6.
 25 Ibid., I9.
 26 Ibid., 98.
 27 Ibid., 65.
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 Because the concepts were empirically empty-they did not bear a definite and
 constant relation to any concrete reality-they were liable to all kinds of twisting
 and reinterpreting. In such a way lawyers were able to reconcile completely
 contradictory judicial decisions as "logical" under the same principle or precedent.
 Although he declared that the great majority of men believed in the certainty
 of law, Frank was primarily interested in, and hostile toward, traditional legal
 theories and their contemporary advocates who controlled the bench and the
 bar. Using a technique reminiscent of that of Veblen, Frank on several occasions
 remarked in footnotes or appendixes that his psychoanalytic approach provided
 only a partial explanation for the legal quest for certainty. But after making that
 qualification in obscure places, usually he continued in the text to write as if
 that approach were the only explanation. Indeed, while consistently proclaiming
 lawyers and judges highly intelligent and learned men, he described them
 throughout as immature, childish, and irrational.
 The two works by Frank and Llewellyn had an immediate impact. Pound,
 then dean of the Harvard Law School and the most renowned legal scholar in
 America, responded early in I93I, ironically in an issue of the Harvard Law
 Review dedicated to Justice Holmes on his ninetieth birthday. Although Pound
 had earlier espoused many of the attitudes associated with realism, by 193I he
 had become wary of some of the more radical implications of pragmatism and
 positivism in the law. He was perhaps, in addition, moved to reply by the fact
 that both Llewellyn and Frank had specifically attacked his work on juristic
 theory. Undoubtedly having Frank most clearly in mind, Pound accused an
 unnamed group of "realists" of allowing their naive faith in empiricism to lead
 them into a philosophical nominalism that denied the existence of legal rules,
 doctrines, principles, and concepts. They overemphasized irregularities and con-
 tradictions and ignored the uniformity and reasonableness of the law. By focusing
 on subjective motives and behavior of judges, Pound asserted, the realists were
 leading legal science into a dead end.28
 Considering his attack unfair, Llewellyn and Frank replied jointly and
 claimed that Pound's criticisms were almost wholly unwarranted. The importance
 of the reply was that Llewellyn and Frank gathered together and defended
 twenty of the better-known critics who, they explained, could be taken as a fair
 sample of the new approach to the law. While emphasizing that the twenty
 represented no "school" and were by no means in complete agreement in their
 own attitudes, Frank and Llewellyn admitted that their criticisms of existing
 legal theory gave them a unified approach. By the end of I93i the new critics
 had been attacked and defended, and, most importantly, they had been per-
 sonally identified and categorized.>
 28 Roscoe Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, XLIV (Mar. I93I),
 697-711".
 29 Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism," 1222-64. Although Llewellyn alone signed the
This content downloaded from 132.174.250.77 on Wed, 13 Dec 2017 11:33:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 434 Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
 While Frank alone had attempted a sweeping psychoanalytic interpretation,
 he and Llewellyn had agreed on several key points. They assumed that human
 knowledge could never be certain and uniformly logical and that law was a
 constantly changing phenomenon. They denounced abstract verbal formulas and
 absolutes as the bane of clear thinking, legal or otherwise. They agreed that the
 "is" and the "ought" should be temporarily separated for the purpose of precise
 study. Finally Llewellyn and Frank were united in calling for careful empirical
 studies of the way the law actually operated in society, with an emphasis on
 the dubious practical impact of legal rules and the likelihood that judicial opin-
 ions were at least partly rationalizations. Because of that focus on judicial motiva-
 tion, both of them, like most realists, looked to their colleagues in psychology for
 clues to help explain the legal process. Behaviorism, Freudianism, and abnormal
 psychology all played a role in the new movement.30 Around those basic attitudes
 the realists centered their attacks on traditional jurisprudence.
 Although the young critics were firm believers in democracy, most of them
 embraced an empirical relativism that raised both practical and theoretical ques-
 tions about the nature of democratic government. The most important practical
 point of their argument was to question and in many cases to reject the idea of a
 government of laws rather than of men. While most democratic legal theories-
 and the United States Constitution-held that established and known laws alone
 should be binding on free citizens, the realists maintained that such laws were
 nonexistent and impossible to attain. Frank had argued that law was uncertain
 in administration and depended largely on the subjective motivations of the
 particular judge who heard the case. "It is fantastic, then," he had declared,
 "to say that usually men can warrantably act in reliance upon 'established law.' "31
 Frank based much of his analysis of the judicial process on the work of
 Judge Hutcheson, who claimed that all judges reached their decisions by "hunches"
 based on an "intuitive flash of understanding" that revealed the proper decision
 in a case. He was referring, Hutcheson pointed out, not to the rationalization or
 the "logomachy" that the judge used to explain his opinion, but to the actual
 way in which he decided a case. "The vital, motivating impulse for the decision,"
 he remarked, "is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for that case."32
 If that were the process of decision, then the social, economic, and moral values
 of the judge were far more important than the rest of the legal structure, and
 the law was clearly a subjective, changeable phenomenon.
 Most of the new critics accepted an analysis similar to Hutcheson's and
 tried to base their legal theory on a subjective conception of judicial decisions.
 article, he explained that it had been conceived and researched in cooperation with Frank. Because
 Llewellyn did the actual writing, Frank did not think he should receive credit as an author.
 30 Patterson, Jurisprudence, 548-52.
 31 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, 125.
 32 Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial
 Decision," Cornell Law Quarterly, XIV (Apr. I929), 285.
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 Radin emphasized the number of conflicting rules that pertained to any case.
 In such a situation the judge was forced to decide cases on an expectation of
 their probable social results. Since that meant a reliance on the judge's subjective
 value standards, the process was actually a matter of personal motivation. "Judges,
 we know, are people," Radin commented, and they thus make their decisions
 like all other people.33 Yntema made the point even more explicitly: "The ideal
 of a government of laws and not of men," he maintained, "is a dream."34 The
 subjective motives of the judge, not the existence of rules, or even constitutions,
 provided the key to understanding the law.
 Morris R. Cohen, a philosopher at the City College of New York and a
 leading critic of realism, pointed to the antidemocratic implication of such a
 judicial theory. "To be ruled by a judge," Cohen declared, "is, to the extent that
 he is not bound by law, tyranny or despotism."'35 When the realists claimed
 that the judge's subjective decision was the only law, he implied, they were
 justifying judicial despotism.
 At that point, the theoretical force of the realist critique became clear, for
 it rejected any concept of a higher law that could provide judges with objective,
 rational guidance to assure a just operative law. A pervasive scientific relativism
 that seemed to undermine any objective or absolute moral standard underlay
 the realist approach. Llewellyn and Frank had both assailed abstract logic and
 deductive rationalism and scorned the absolutes that those approaches generated.
 Their determination to make concrete empirical facts the touchstone for all
 analytical concepts seemed necessarily to exclude ideas of "ought" in favor of
 facts about "is." If what men ought to do was not identical with what they
 did in fact, then there was no basis in their approach for discussing moral con-
 cepts except as mere psychological data. It would, in any case, be impossible
 to establish the objective validity of any such ethical values.
 Some of the realists made their relativism explicit and direct. Cook, another
 of the founders of the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins University who had
 been trained first as a physicist, looked enthusiastically to the physical sciences
 for his legal inspiration. Scorning the futility of deduction, he emphasized that
 human knowledge had "reached the era of relativity." By relativity, he explained,
 he meant "a point of view, which, whatever may happen to specific doctrines,
 seems destined to remain as a permanent achievement in human thought."36
 Neither legal nor moral theory could escape that era.
 Applying the scientific, relativist approach to the question of legal and moral
 33 Max Radin, "The Tleory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think," American Bar Associa-
 tion journal, XI (June 1925), 359.
 84Hessel E. Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," Yale Law journal,
 XXXVII (Feb. I928), 476.
 85 Morris R. Cohen, "Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law," Columbia Law Review,
 XXVII (Mar. 1927), 244.
 86 Walter Wheeler Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," American Bar Association Journal, XIII
 (June 1927), 305.
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 standards, Moore, who taught first at Columbia University and later at Yale,
 similarly rejected the idea of absolutes: "Ultimates are phantoms drifting upon
 the stream of day dreams." Arguing for a pragmatic standard of judgment, he in-
 sisted that "human experience discloses no ultimates."37 Nelles, a professor at
 Yale University, carried the approach to its extreme. "I deny ethical right and
 ought without qualification," he declared in I933. He scorned the possibility of
 both scientific and deductive ethics. "In the twentieth century," he remarked,
 "popular feeling of the wickedness of denying ethical right and ought can no
 longer command the unconscious deference of an important mind."38 In the
 minds of most of the realists there could be no such thing as a demonstrable
 moral standard.
 The pragmatism and apparent ethical relativism of men like Cook, Moore,
 and Nelles shocked much of the legal profession. Although the counterattack
 did not reach its bitterest phase until after I935, it had clearly begun by the
 early thirties. John Dickinson, one of Pound's leading disciples, and Hermann
 Kantorowicz, a professor at the New School for Social Research, criticized the
 realists for dismissing the importance of rules and pointed to the philosophical
 difficulties in their approach.39 Hutchins, then president of the University of
 Chicago, and Mortimer Adler, a prominent philosopher, joined the assault on
 realism, basing their attacks on an Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Rationally
 knowable moral principles, not inchoate empirical facts, were the proper foun-
 dation of jurisprudence.40 By excluding ethical considerations and reverting to
 a philosophical nominalism, many scholars believed, the realists were necessarily
 making force the only meaningful arbiter of human affairs and destroying the
 ethical basis of democracy.
 To harm the cause of democratic government was the last thing the realists
 hoped to do. In attacking traditional abstractions and nonempirical concepts
 of justice, they were usually assailing what they considered the practical injustices
 of American society. Abstraction in economics and politics, as in the law, they
 believed, had been one of the biggest obstacles to the attainment of a truly
 democratic society. Frank, Oliphant, Clark, Arnold, Douglas, and Felix Cohen
 were all ardent New Dealers who shared a strong hostility to the method of
 juristic reasoning that struck down social welfare laws and wrought what they
 considered great human injustices. Most of the other realists expressed equally
 strong disapproval of the social and economic situation of the thirties. The new
 37 Underhill Moore, "Rational Basis of Legal Institutions," Columbia Law Review, XXIII (Nov.
 3923), 6I2.
 38 Review of Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, ibid., XXXII (Apr. I933), 767, 766.
 39 John Dickinson, "Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision," University of
 Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, LXXIX (May 1931), 833-68; Hermann
 Kantorowicz, "Some Rationalism about Realism," Yale Law 7ournal, XLIII (June 1934), 1240-53.
 40 Hutchins' most famous attack on legal realism appeared as "The Autobiography of an Ex-Law
 Student," reprinted in No Friendly Voice (Chicago, 1936), 41-50; Mortimer Adler, "Legal Cer-
 tainty," Pt. 2 of "Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium," Columbia L4w Review, XXXI (Jan.
 1931), 82-115.
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 criticism was thus not intentionally hostile toward the idea of democratic gov-
 ernment. Indeed, after I932 it lent itself readily to the support of concrete polit-
 ical reform. As early as I93I Frank defended the realists against charges that
 they excluded ethical considerations from the law. "The point is," he retorted,
 "that the rational and ethical factors are thwarted in their operations by the
 conventional tendency to ignore the non-rational and non-ethical factors."'" The
 problem was not whether there was something abstract called justice, but rather
 how human relations could be made more just in practice. Though the theoretical
 problems the realists raised left them open to bitter attack, the obtuse formalism of
 American constitutional interpretation throughout the first third of the twentieth
 century helped drive them to their extreme positions. The manifest human needs
 created by the depression further convinced them of the need for a more realistic
 and flexible legal theory to attain what they considered a truly democratic society.
 While the early critiques of legal realism tended to be mild and often dis-
 criminating, by I936 they were becoming wholly denunciatory. The tone of the
 attack grew in bitterness in proportion to the spread of fear and uncertainty
 created by the success of the totalitarian governments of Europe. As Americans
 became more acutely aware of the despotic and repressive practices in Russia,
 in Italy, and most especially in Germany, the great majority condemned them
 in clear and forceful terms. As the possibility of another war drew nearer, they
 clung more tightly to the ideal of democracy as the best and morally ideal form
 of government. The realists had raised, unintentionally, fundamental questions
 about the possibility and validity of democratic government at a time when the
 country needed reassurance and conviction.
 Inside the ominous framework constructed by the existence of the totalitarian
 governments, a new extremism in the realist movement itself was working to
 invite the bitter attack. In I935 Robinson and Arnold, who jointly conducted
 seminars at the Yale University Law School on psychology and the law, pub-
 lished studies that assumed a sweeping ethical relativism. Robinson, who revealed
 a marked antipathy toward traditional deductive juristic thought, argued that
 the whole legal system should be reformed in line with the discoveries of modern
 scientific psychology. Committed to a thoroughgoing empiricism, he charged
 that "there is not now and never has been a deductive science of ethics."42 Moral
 values developed, instead, out of concrete situations and were intelligible only
 in that context. No absolute, abstract, or universal moral values existed.
 Arnold went beyond Robinson's position and argued that abstract theories
 and moral values were not only unfounded, but were wholly mythical. Moral
 ideals served only as satisfying symbols for emotional needs and had no further
 41 Review of Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, Yale Law Journal, XL (May 1931), 1121 n. For an
 example of the relationship between legal realism and political reform, see Jerome Frank, "Modern
 Trends in Jurisprudence," American Law School Review, VII (Apr. 1934), I063-69.
 42 Robinson, Law and the Lawyers, 225; see also review of Harold Ernest Burtt, Legal Psychology,
 Yale Law Journal, XLI (May 1932), IIo6.
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 connection with anything real. The proper way to study theories and ideals,
 Arnold explained, was to ignore them as "principles of truth" and regard them
 simply "as symbolic thinking and conduct which condition the behavior of men
 in groups."43 In fact, he concluded, if theories were to be effective as emotional
 symbols, they would have to be empirically false. In his sweeping rejection of
 the validity of such ideals Arnold left no basis for distinguishing between morally
 good or bad symbols or for establishing the legitimacy of any ethical position
 whatever. In his approach ethical values faded through relativism and out of
 existence.
 Shortly after their two books were published, at a time when men could see
 the rampant brutality of Nazism, the vigorous counterattack began its harshest
 phase. Rufus C. Harris, dean of the Tulane University Law School, Philip
 Mecham, a professor at the University of Iowa Law School, and Morris R. Cohen
 all charged that realism paved the way for totalitarianism by denying objective
 ethical standards and making law an amoral coercive force.44 Edgar Boden-
 heimer, an attorney in the Solicitor's Office in the Department of Labor, argued
 the same line in his important work on jurisprudence. "There is a certain danger
 that the skepticism of realistic jurisprudence may, perhaps very much against
 the intents and wishes of its representatives, prepare the intellectual ground for
 a tendency toward totalitarianism."45
 The growing condemnation of realism reached a climax in I940 when two
 of the most prominent legal scholars in the country, Pound and Lon L. Fuller
 of Duke University, published lectures assailing the new movement. Pound
 had long been critical of realism, and by I940 he was ready to name it a "give-
 it-up philosophy." Refusing to discuss the work of any particular individual, he
 issued a blanket charge against them all: "The political and juristic preaching
 of today leads logically to [political] absolutism."46 Fuller, like Pound, had
 earlier shared some of the attitudes associated with realism, but by I934 he had
 turned into a stalwart critic. Realism attempted the impossible, he argued, for
 man could never ignore the ethical problems in the law, not even for the alleged
 purpose of scientific scholarship. In the end realism "remains formal and sterile."
 Such a negative attitude spreading through society was a major cause, he ex-
 plained, "in bringing Germany and Spain to the disasters which engulfed those
 countries.
 43 Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Government (2d ed., New York, 1962), Xiv; see also
 ibid., I0, I7, 34, 98.
 44 Rufus C. Harris, "Idealism Emergent in Jurisprudence," Tulane Law Review, X (Feb. I936),
 I69-87; Philip Mecham, "The Jurisprudence of Despair," Iowa Law Review, XXI (May I936),
 669-92; review of Robinson, Law and the Lawyers, Cornell Law Quarterly, XXII (Dec. I936),
 17I-78; and review of Arnold, Symbols of Government, Illinois Law Revicw, XXXI (Nov. I936),
 41 I-I 8.
 45 Edgar Bodenheimer, jurisprudence (New York, I940), 3I6.
 46 Roscoe Pound, Contemporary juristic Theory (Claremont, Calif., 1940), 9; see also ibid., i, 8-i I.
 47 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (2d ed., Boston, I966), 89, I22; see also ibid.,
 4-6, II, 64-65.
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 Though Pound and Fuller attacked realism vigorously, the most severe and
 extreme attacks came from a number of Catholic legal scholars who during the
 thirties helped to generate a resurgent Neo-Scholastic legal movement in the
 United States. Much of the impetus came from the work of the American
 Catholic Philosophical Association, which established a round table on philosophy
 and law at its meeting in I933. In addition to sponsoring scholarly papers and
 monographs, the round table attempted to organize a unified jurisprudence
 among professors at all Christian church-related law schools in the country.
 Although relatively few non-Catholics expressed interest, the suggestion drew
 support from many Catholics who saw the situation as desperate.
 As other critics had done, the Catholics pictured realism as ethical relativism
 undermining the foundations of democracy. Those who adhered to such doctrines
 as pragmatism and empiricism, as the realists did, declared Dean Clarence Manion
 of the Notre Dame University Law School, were betraying the American citizen
 and "preparing to sell him into slavery."48 Such dire predictions exceeded those of
 most other critics, for many of the Catholics refused to qualify them in any
 way. They saw such a definite and direct causal connection between ethical
 relativism and totalitarianism that they seemed to believe in what has been
 called the autonomy of ideas. Disregarding such factors as economic structures
 and political institutions, they argued that the ideas associated with legal realism
 and ethical relativism, by themselves, would lead naturally and inevitably away
 from traditional democracy to a ruthless totalitarianism. "Godless Behaviorism
 and Pragmatism are the headhunters, with Democracy and popular sovereignty
 the victims," declared Father Francis E. Lucey, a regent of the Georgetown Uni-
 versity School of Law. "Democracy versus the Absolute State means Natural Law
 versus Realism."49
 While the reaction against pragmatism and relativism was bitterest in the
 legal profession, the attack spread through all areas of American intellectual life.
 In the fields of history, philosophy, literature, and the social sciences many scholars
 began pointing to the dangerous implications of scientific relativism and con-
 demning their colleagues who had embraced some form of it. By I937 Walter
 Lippmann had completely rejected his earlier pragmatism and condemned the
 "aimless and turbulent moral relativity" of twentieth-century social thought.50
 Hans Kohn, Lewis Mumford, Reinhold Niebuhr, Thomas Mann, Alvin Johnson,
 48 Clarence Manion, "The American Metaphysics in Law," Proceedings of the American Catholic
 Philosophical Association, XVIII (I942), 133-34. For examples of the Catholic critique, see Miriam
 Theresa Rooney, "Law and the New Logic," ibid., XVI (1940), 192-222; Brendan F. Brown,
 "Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in American Jurisprudence," Notre Dame Lawyer,
 XV (Nov. 1939), 9-25; Frederick J. deSloovere, "Natural Law and Current Sociological Jurisprudence,"
 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XVII (I94I), I37-42; Dietrich
 von Hildebrand, "The Dethronement of Truth," ibid., XVIII (1942), 3-i6; and Paul L. Gregg,
 "The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes," Georgetown Law journal, XXXI (Mar. I943), 262-95.
 49 Francis E. Lucey, "Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions
 to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society," ibid., XXX (Apr. 1942), 526, 533.
 50 Walter Lippmann, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society (Boston, I937), 380,
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 and Van Wyck Brooks were among those who joined in blaming pragmatists
 and relativists for the desperate state of world affairs. "This recognition of guilt
 must pave the way, not to maudlin regrets," they declared in a united manifesto,
 "but to immediate atonement."'51
 Although the critics of legal realism undoubtedly believed that the new at-
 titude directly threatened the existence of democracy, many of them were ani-
 mated also by other social motives. Some critics, for example, were representa-
 tives of the wealthy groups that had violently opposed the New Deal since I934
 and correctly understood the devastating relevance of realism to their strained
 method of constitutional interpretation. One of the most extreme attacks, for
 example, came from a New York lawyer, Raoul E. Desvernine, who had been
 in charge of the Legal Division of the American Liberty League. When he
 charged in I94I that realism was "radically subversive of the American way of
 life," few could have doubted that he had specifically in mind the realist argu-
 ment for a more permissive constitutional attitude toward New Deal legisla-
 tion.52 For those who already regarded the New Deal as protototalitarian there
 was no real distinction between attacking the Roosevelt administration and con-
 demning legal realism as antidemocratic. Rather, the accepted fact of New Deal
 regimentation gave evidence to the charge against the legal attitude that defended
 and justified such regimentation.
 There was a different ulterior motive behind the attacks of most of the Cath-
 olics, who politically were generally sympathetic to the New Deal. The intel-
 lectual attitudes they associated with legal realism denied their deepest articles
 of religious faith and emotional conviction. The Catholic faith in its funda-
 mentals was indissolubly linked with a hierarchical institution that claimed
 ability to interpret an absolutely true moral law, based on the truths of revelation
 and reason. Realism and modern empiricism rejected those foundations, and the
 Catholics began their assault in defense, not just of their conception of democ-
 racy, but of their faith and their Church. Because of their religious and philo-
 sophical conviction that such attitudes were false and evil, they quickly identified
 them with the practice of totalitarianism, which was also false and evil. A number
 went so far as to identify American democratic ideas with their own Catholic
 philosophy. The "definite American philosophy of life," explained one typical
 writer, was "drawn directly from the Catholic philosophy of life."53 Having long
 been considered not completely American, the Catholics were at last able to assert
 their legitimacy by defining themselves as the true descendants of the American
 Revolution, and at the same time discrediting their dangerous intellectual ad-
 versaries.54
 51 Hans Kohn et at., The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy (New York, 1940), 19.
 52 Raoul E. Desvernine, "Philosophy and Order in Law," Proceedings of the American Catholic
 Philosophical Association, XVII (I94I), 135-36.
 58 William Franklin Sands, "What Is an American?" Commonweal, XXXIII (Feb. 21, I94I), 438.
 4 See also Moorehouse F. X. Millar, "The Origins of Sound Democratic Principles in Catholic
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 Whatever their motivations, the attacks had an effect. Much of the work
 of the realists had slighted the importance of ethical theory. Their philosophical
 assumptions had undermined the concept of a rational moral standard. Their
 ethical relativism seemed to many to mean that no Nazi barbarity could be
 justly branded as evil, while their identification of law with the actions of gov-
 ernment officials gave even the most offensive Nazi edict the sanction of true
 law. Juxtaposing that logic to the actions of the totalitarian states, the critics
 had painted realism in the most ominous and shocking colors.
 The damning charges forced the realists to assert their innocence. "I hope,"
 declared Radin, "I have never said that ideas like wrong and right, or any
 ideas, are worthless or meaningless terms."55 An empiricism that tried to predict
 actual decisions was "an incomplete way to see law," Llewellyn admitted in
 I940, for "the heart and core of Jurisprudence" was the problem of ethical purpose
 in the law. "I for one," Llewellyn exclaimed, "am ready to do open penance for
 any part I may have played in giving occasion for the feeling that modern
 jurisprudes or any of them had ever lost sight of this."56 Frank, Yntema, Pat-
 terson, and Felix Cohen all explicitly defended the realists against their critics,
 arguing that they had never denied an ethical goal in the law.57 That defense
 was only partially relevant, however, since the fundamental question was actu-
 ally whether the basic philosophical and methodological assumptions that char-
 acterized realism left any rational basis for affirming the legitimacy of an
 ethical goal.
 Facing a barrage of criticism for his extreme views, Frank ultimately drew
 closer to the natural law school than any of the other realists. During the early
 forties he looked increasingly for the moral justification of democracy and seemed
 to find it in the Thomistic concept of natural law. By i945 he was maintaining
 that most Americans refused to accept the concept of natural law only because
 of a confusion in terminology that gave them the wrong idea of its true meaning.
 "Most intelligent Americans, if the 'basic principles' of Scholastic natural law are
 described to them," he argued, "will find them completely acceptable."58 Three
 Tradition," Catholic Historical Review, XIV (Apr. I928), I04-26, and "Scholastic Philosophy and
 American Political Theory," Thought, I (June I936), II2-36; Raoul E. Desvernine, "The Creed
 of Americanism," Notre Dame Lawyer, XVII (Mar. 1942), 2I6-26; Robert I. Gannon, "What Are
 We Really Fighting?" Fordham Law Review, XI (Nov. I942), 249-54; Goetz Briefs, "Philosophy
 of the Democratic State," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XV (1939),
 36-50; and Patrick J. Roche, Democracy in the Light of Four Current Educational Philosophies
 (Washington, D. C., 1942).
 5 Max Radin, "In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law," Yale Law journal, LI (June
 I942), I275.
 56Karl N. Llewellyn, "On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence," Columbia Law Review,
 XL (Apr. I940), 593, 603.
 57Hessel E. Yntema, "Jurisprudence on Parade," Michigan Law Review, XXXIX (May I941),
 II64-65; Edwin W. Patterson, "Forward," in Edwin N. Garlan, Legal Realism and Justice (New
 York, 194I), viii; Felix S. Cohen, "The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence," Modern Law
 Review, I (June 1937), 24-25; Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of Government
 in a Democracy (New York, 1942), Appendix v, esp. 297-300.
 58Jerome Frank, Fate and Freedom: A Philosophy for Free Americans (New York, I945), 295;
 see also ibid., 98-99, 259-60.
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 years later he made his position clear and unequivocal: "I do not understand
 how any decent men today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modern civiliza-
 tion, the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to human conduct, as
 stated by Thomas Aquinas."59 Although Frank still called for empirical analysis
 of the legal system and insisted on the uncertainty and confusion in the applica-
 tion of principles, he had come a long way from the philosophical implications
 of Law and the Modern Mind.
 Llewellyn, too, moved in the direction of natural law, though he stopped short
 of Frank's enthusiastic acceptance. Although he acknowledged a recent "debt"
 to Aquinas for the Schoolman's work on the philosophy of law, Llewellyn em-
 braced neither Thomism nor the whole doctrine of natural law.60 He accepted
 instead the general idea of a natural law, but translated it into a less precise and
 more intuitive concept. Natural law, he believed, was the name given for a
 universal human "urge" or "drive" for "right, or decency, or justice." Rather
 than being the opposite of legal empiricism as many had charged, Llewellyn
 declared, natural law was "an interesting and highly useful complement. "61
 While Llewellyn added a general concept of natural law to his legal theory
 and emphasized the importance of proper ethical ends in law, he remained
 true to his empiricism and retained a sharp skepticism concerning the powers
 of deductive logic. "When it comes to ultimate substance of the Good," he wrote
 early in I942, "I repeat that I can find no clarity, or any conviction of reason,
 or of deduction as to specific matters, from the broad ultimates others have
 found clear." If pressed for an ultimate justification for democratic government,
 or for any values, he admitted, "I have no answer."62
 In spite of their early leadership, neither Llewellyn nor Frank was typical of
 the other realists in the move toward natural law. Radin perhaps best represented
 the others. Acknowledging that realism must place an added weight on ethical
 considerations, he declared that "the lawyer's task is ultimately concerned with
 justice" and emphasized that "any legal teaching that ignored justice had missed
 most of its point."63 But even with the modification in his outlook, Radin re-
 mained a convinced empiricist with no use for abstract formulations. Justice or
 any other idea, he declared in I940, "has no objective existence." Hence it existed
 only in the minds of men and was, therefore, only meaningful to the extent
 that actual men subscribed to it. In that case the concept of justice held by
 juridical officials was the source of a community's operative concept of justice.
 "In the last analysis," Radin argued, "justice must be a common denominator
 of what a specific group-the judges themselves-think is just."64 "Objectified"
 59 Id., "Preface to Sixth Printing," Law and the Modern Mind, xx.
 60 Karl N. Llewellyn, "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law," University of Chicago
 Law Review, IX (Feb. I942), 247.
 61 Id., "One Realist's View of Natural Law for Judges," Notre Dame Lawyer, XV (Nov. I939), 3, 8.
 62 Id., "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law," 264.
 63Max Radin, "The Education of a Lawyer," California Law Review, XXV (Sept. 1937), 688.
 64 Id., Law as Logic and Experience (New Haven, Conn., 1940), 156-58.
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 justice was real, fundamental, and essential, but it was necessarily a changing
 justice, wholly relative to the moral beliefs of the community in general and
 of the judges in particular.
 Thus, while the realists modified their tone and protested their innocence,
 they did not, with the exception of Frank, give in to their critics on any funda-
 mental point. They agreed that deduction was sterile in the field of values
 and claimed that their critics were as unable as they were to demonstrate con-
 clusively the ultimate validity of any ethical ideals. Most would have agreed
 with Cook, who compared the advocates of deductive ethical systems to the
 infants in John Watson's experiments who exhibited "fear reaction" when they
 lost their sense of physical support. "They fear the loss of support of fixed prin-
 ciples which can be used automatically in cases of doubt," Cook charged, and
 hence they struck out wildly at those who pointed to the limits of human reason
 and suggested the true relativity to be found in reality.65
 As most of the realists lost little of their confidence in science, so too they
 lost little of their ability to retaliate. Pound's condemnation of realism in light
 of his own earlier work, Yntema charged, "bears a tragic aspect of schizologic
 aberration."66 Fuller's legal theory, Patterson pointed out, was marred throughout
 by a pervasive ambiguity. "Surely the clarification of basic confusions does not
 hamper the exercise of the creative reason," he commented dryly.67 Myres S.
 McDougal, a young professor at Yale University, accused Fuller of "preaching
 pseudo-inspirational sermons." The day would come, McDougal hoped, when
 lawyers could be trained as scientific scholars "and not as priests in outworn
 and meaningless faiths whether of 'law' or of 'ethics.' "68 Fred Rodell, another
 of the younger realists, charged that all those legal thinkers who spoke in sacred
 terms of some abstract "Law" had been "taught in mental goose-step."69 It
 was only appropriate to the spirit of much of the debate that Walter B. Kennedy,
 a leading Catholic scholar at Fordham University, returned the same charge in
 I94I by calling realism a "goose-step philosophy."70
 By 194I when America entered the Second World War, the bitter debate
 within the legal profession had reached its most intense phase, and it revealed
 a number of important facts about American thought in general and legal theory
 in particular. Most important, the debate demonstrated the depth of a basic
 split that divided two groups of American intellectuals who, for want of better
 terms, might be called scientific relativists and rational absolutists. On the one
 65 "Walter Wheeler Cook," in My Philosophy of Law: Credos of Sixteen American Scholars
 (Boston, I94I), 64.
 66 Yntema, "Jurisprudence on Parade," II63.
 67 Review of Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, Iowa Law Review, XXVI (Nov. 1940),
 I72-73.
 68 Myres S. McDougal, "Fuller v. the American Legal Realists: An Intervention," Yale Law
 Journal, L (Mar. 1941), 840.
 69 Fred Rodell, Woe unto You, Lawyers! (2d ed., New York, 1957), 149.
 70 "Walter B. Kennedy," in My Philosophy of Law, I5I-52.
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 hand, the realists owed their inspiration and intellectual attitudes to a cluster
 of ideas associated with modern science. Truth was wholly dependent on em-
 pirically established facts and hypotheses, they agreed, and it was necessarily
 tentative and relative. On the other hand, the absolutists, such as Hutchins, Adler,
 and the Catholics, believed that human reason could discover certain universal
 principles of justice by analyzing philosophically the nature of reality. Deductive
 logic could demonstrate the truth of propositions and lead man to correct ap-
 plications in settling particular, practical questions. The universal principles
 formed for the absolutists the basis for all ethical knowledge, which was demon-
 strably certain.
 These two fundamentally irreconcilable attitudes were in large part respon-
 sible for the intensity and extremism in the debate. Since both sides started
 from widely divergent assumptions, they were often unable to understand, let
 alone sympathize with, their enemy's position. The realists saw rational absolu-
 tism as pointless and often subjected it to ridicule and scorn. Felix Cohen referred
 to it as "Transcendental Nonsense," while Arnold and Frank compared it to
 superstitious incantations chanted by witch doctors and faith healers. The ra-
 tional absolutists returned the scorn in full, charging the realists with everything
 from atheism to Communism to nihilism. As the realists were often unable to
 understand how anyone could accept some of the canons of rational absolutism
 in light of the discoveries of modern science and philosophy, their critics were
 equally unable to see how any man could fail to accept that which was self-
 evident and necessary to give support to a universally valid ethical system. Such
 a system was necessary, they continually insisted, if men were to condemn totali-
 tarianism rationally. With each side committed to its own obvious truths and
 faced with an implacable opponent, vilification and the questioning of motives
 became an almost automatic recourse. Those who would not see must have
 some hidden and unworthy purpose.
 That deep division was also evident in the awkward positions taken by
 Pound, Fuller, Morris Cohen, and a number of other critics of realism. Such
 scholars knew the severe limitations of deductive logic and were committed
 to some form of legal empiricism. At the same time, however, they saw many
 of the theoretical problems realism created, and they agreed, when faced with
 the challenge of totalitarian ideology and practice, that some supralegal moral
 standard was necessary as the basis for ethical judgments. Torn between two
 conflicting attitudes, they tried desperately to reconcile them or to develop a
 coherent ethical position that would withstand the criticisms from both sides.
 Fuller's concept of natural law, for example, placed him distinctly outside the
 realist movement, but failed to bring him into any real philosophical agreement
 with the Thomists. It was too abstract foir the one side and too positivistic for
 the other.
 The long debate also clearly revealed the plight of ethical theory in the middle
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 of the twentieth century. The incisive criticisms of modern philosophy and the
 dramatic impact of experimental science had made rational absolutism untenable
 in the minds of most educated Americans. Many were ready to conclude that
 moral justification in any ultimate sense was an impossible and meaningless
 concept. "Having surrendered the quest for certainty," Cook insisted, quoting
 Dewey, "we can offer no guarantees."'71 Though difficult to deny intellectually,
 that conclusion was dissatisfying to most Americans at the time when Nazism
 was perpetrating its outrages on both Germany and the rest of Europe.
 The apparent success and spread of the totalitarian ideologies, backed by
 military might, exacerbated the internal division in American thought and placed
 the fundamental problem of the ethical basis of democracy into clear relief. The
 barbarity and repression evident in the various totalitarian countries enraged
 most American intellectuals. Feeling the deep need to condemn them in the
 clearest and strongest terms, they were forced to deal in some way with rationally
 based ethical judgments. That necessity created immense stress in the minds
 of many who either doubted the possibility of such judgments or found them-
 selves unable to produce them. Some, like Becker and Malinowski, turned on
 much of their earlier work and argued that there were broad moral values that
 in fact did support the ideal of democracy and that showed equally that totali-
 tarianism was evil. Others, such as Percy W. Bridgman and Stuart A. Rice,
 admitted that there was no ultimate ethical sanction for democracy and sug-
 gested only that human experience indicated that the great majority of men
 preferred it to Nazism. Most intellectuals finally had to ignore their doubts and
 the intellectual difficulties that plagued ethical theory and in the end simply assert
 the evil of totalitarianism and the relative goodness and desirability of democracy.
 Although the Catholics in contrast expressed great certainty in the power
 of reason to discover ultimate principles, the debate revealed a defensive attitude
 on their part that at times reached extreme proportions. In spite of their fervent
 religious and intellectual convictions, they realized that they were fighting a
 battle against the ever-strengthening intellectual trends of the past three hundred
 years. Abstract rationalism simply could not stand against the combined forces
 of pragmatism, scientific empiricism, and modern critical philosophy. The vitriolic
 tone and extreme, unfounded accusations made against such movements as legal
 realism showed clearly the sense of intellectual frustration and institutional anxiety
 that underlay Catholic legal thought in the 1930's. The identification of realism
 and relativism with totalitarianism was the ground on which the Catholics hoped
 to make their belated victorious stand against the intellectual forces of the twen-
 tieth century. Though they had some limited success during the time of most
 severe intellectual crisis in the late thirties and early forties, their counterattack
 failed, and the Catholics themselves eventually modified some of their more
 strident positions.
 71 "Walter Wheeler Cook," 64.
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 Finally, the debate suggested the course that American legal thinking would
 take in the years after the Second World War. While the idea of natural law
 grew somewhat in importance-and certainly proved useful for such purposes
 as trying war criminals-through the late forties and early fifties, it died down
 again and became mainly an isolated and parochial concept that enjoyed little
 support outside of a few Catholic law schools. Where it did have vitality it was
 made part of a broader empirical synthesis as in the work of F. S. C. Northrop.
 While ignoring some of its more extreme theoretical tendencies, the profession
 generally accepted many of the ideas associated with legal realism. That move-
 ment helped establish the importance of factual research in law, the necessity
 of empirical studies of the legal process, the legitimacy of a more flexible con-
 stitutional interpretation, and the acceptance of a pragmatic, operational concept
 of law. In spite of the problems the realists presented, both philosophically and
 legally, they were pointing toward the future by suggesting fruitful courses of
 study and more useful methods of analysis. The alliance the realists helped forge
 between legal theory and empirical analysis fortified the trend toward sociological
 jurisprudence that had begun forty years before and that was to become a com-
 monly accepted part of American law in the years after the Second World War.
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